The paper studies the design of efficient anti-inflationary policies in a two-country interdependent economic system.
Introduction
The purpose of monetary policy is to ensure that money doesn't matter.
There are three reasons why money may matter for real economic performance.
First, to the extent that monetary growth is causally connected with inflation, insufficient or excessive money growth (even if fully predictable) will cause the actual inflation rate to differ from the optimal one. The optimal inflation rate is the one that produces satiation with costlessly produced non-interest--bearing money balances. It is associated with a zero nominal interest rate. If the real interest rate is positive, the optimal inflation rate will be negative. This result is both well-known and pritically uninteresting, Equally obvious is the second reason why money may The third reason why money may matter hinges on the presence of nominal inertia or stickiness in the behaviour of wages and/or prices.
Given such "Keynesian" features, tight monetary policy will not result in a transition to a lower price level or inflation rate at full employment.
Even if in the long run, reductions in money growth are associated with equal reductions in the rate of inflation, the real-time transition or traverse may involve persistent and significant periods of excess capacity and involuntary unemployment. Well-designed monetary policy minimizes 1 2 these output or unemployment costs of achieving a sustained and sustainable reduction in the rate of inflation. To minimize the "sacrifice ratio,"
it will often be necessary to use the instruments of fiscal policy in conjunction with monetary policy. The two are of course linked through the government's budget identity, but there are infinitely many combinations of changes in taxes, spending, borrowing and external financing that are consistent with a given sustained change in the rate of monetary growth. In an open economy, external policies and events will alter the current and anticipated future constraints faced by the domestic policy maker.
Thus, under a credible fixed exchange rate regime, the domestic rate of inflation cannot be systematically higher or lower than the world rate of inflation. Foreign monetary and fiscal policy actions affect the domestic economy through goods markets (e.g., by altering world demand for home country traded output), through interest rate linkages and, in the case of an endogenous exchange rate regime, through spot and forward exchange markets. Freely floating exchange rates do not, except in a very special and practically unimportant cases, insulate a country from external real and financial shocks, nor do they prevent the spillover of domestic disturbances into the rest of the world. Only the most naive zero-capital mobility, trade balance view of exchange rate determination could lead one to believe that "decoupling" through exchange rate flexibility is an option.
1The sacrifice ratio is the cumulative undiscounted net output or unemployment cost of achieving a one percent steady-state reduction in the inflation rate.
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The existence of mutual spillovers is not by itself sufficient for policy coordination. It could be the case that policy actions are properly ?tpriced so that even decentralized, non-cooperative policy design leads to Pareto-efficient outcomes. Merely to state this possibility is almost sufficient to refute it. The two main reasons are that market prices are not sufficient indices of marginal social value and that national policy makers are not sub-atomistic, competitive agents. Even in highly abstract, idealized representations of competitive, market-clearing economies such as the overlapping generations model, the incompleteness of the set of markets (reflecting, e.g., the difficulties one is likely to encounter when attempting to make binding private contracts with the dead and the unborn) may prevent prices in the markets that do exist from being accurate social shadow prices. Other reasons for the non-existence of a complete set of Arrow-Debreu markets are adverse selection and moral hazard. The insufficiency of market prices for harmonizing non-cooperative policy actions is especially serious when labor, goods or credit markets are in disequi--librium (or in non-Wairasian equilibrium) and non-price rationing occurs.
In addition, the non-atomistic nature of national policy makers means that they do not necessarily treat market prices or other policy makers' actions as parametric when designing policies that are optimal from a national perspective. Government behavior in countries other than Andorra, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, etc., is more properly viewed as a non-cooperative dynamic game against other governments and against markets with anticipating (even if competitive) private agents. In these markets some governments will be large participants.
To assert that, given externalities and non-competitive behavior by governments, there exists scope for global welfare improving policy coordination schemes that move the world economy closer to the contract 4 curve, is not to argue that there may not also be many "cooperative" schemes that will result (or in the past have resulted) in reduced global welfare.
Nor does the merely qualitative proposition that there exist welfare improving arrangements for international cooperation and coordination deny the possibility that the quantitative significance of the improvement could be slight and/or highly uncertain. The task of quantifying the fruits of international policy coordination is an important one but lies beyond the scope of this paper. In what follows I propose to study the design of efficient disinflationary policies in an interdependent economic system.
The formal vehicle for this analysis is a small and simple analytical twocountry macroeconomic rational expectations model.2 I will start with the case of the flex-price New Classical wonderland in which credibility of monetary policy is necessary and sufficient for costless disinflation. The consequences of successive concessions to realism can then be traced in a relatively straightforward manner. The consequences of unilateral and coordinated policy design and implementation are emphasized throughout.
In what follows, "first-best" policies which eliminate inflation at a stroke without output or unemployment costs will almost always exist, and can be derived by inspection. It will therefore not be necessary formally to specify an objective functional penalizing deviations from zero inflation and from full employment or capacity output. The paper does not deal at all with the "incentive-compatibility" of the firstbest policies, i.e., with whether these policies are time-consistent.
2The analysis relies heavily on the single-country analysis of efficient disinflationary policy in Buiter and Miller [1983b] . The two-country model is a slight extension of the model used in Miller [1982] .
II. A Model in Which Credibility of Monetary Policy Is Necessary and Sufficient for a Costless Sustained Reduction in Inflation
The various models to be considered in this paper will differ from each other only as regards the specification of the inflation process.
They will have a common set of portfolio balance equations and output market equilibrium equations. These are given in equations (1) 
ce+v*_v The money stock is to be interpreted as narrow money, say the monetary base. Domestic money is held only by domestic residents, for domestic transactions purposes. There is no direct currency substitution. This seems reasonable as domestic money is dominated as a store of value by short domestic bonds and foreign money by short foreign bonds. Between these two interest-bearing assets there is perfect substitutability. Equation (3) represents uncovered interest parity, the outcome of perfect markets and risk-neutral speculative behavior. The consumer price index is a weighted average of the two national value added deflators as shown in (4a) and (4b).
Indirect taxes can drive a wedge between factor costs and market prices.3 e absence of explicit consideration of the government budget idçntity is justified as follows.
In natural units using upper case letters) the domestic output market equilihrium condition and public sector budget identity (under a freely floating exchange rate regime) can be written as follows: 7
In the New Classical wonderland of this section, output is always equal to its exogenous capacity or full employment level, i.e., G denotes exhaustive public spending on goods and services, T total taxes net of transfers. B is the nominal stock of government bonds. f, the effect of fiscal policy on demand in equation (2a) Note that, if the balanced-budget multiplier is positive, then FG > FT I assume that as regards bond financing the domestic authorities throughout follow a constant financial crowding out pressure" policy which consists in keeping constant the real stock of government debt B/P.
The foreign authorities similarly keep B*/P* constant. Thus B = B(P/P) and B* = B*(P*/P*) . Whether or not B/P and B*/P* are arguments in the money demand functions and/or the output demand functions, their constancy makes it unnecessary to consider them further. I am ignoring as of secondorder importance the fact that domestic bonds may be held abroad and foreign bonds domestically. Let Bddenote domestic holdings of domestic government debt and B foreign holdings of domestic government debt. 
Equivalently (except at those instants at which "news" arrives),
we can look at the expected rates of inflation given in (9'a) and (9'b):
-yf + (Ak +y_1) -
Even if total (global) real bond wealth doesn't change, a redistribution of a given total through current account deficits and surpluses (or through capital gains and losses) may change total demand for a country's output if the marginal propensity to spend out of bond wealth on that country's output differs between the two countries. I rule out any such "transfer effects" either on total spending or on spending on the mdividual countries' outputs.
Given our bond financing assumption, we can write , the authorities can use total taxes net of transfers to choose the rate of monetary growth, p . This still leaves them real spending, C, to set the current fiscal stimulus f at its desired value. Note, however, that since total tax receipts T (and C) are "assigned"
to p and f , the indirect tax rate T cannot be varied independently.
Higher values of T. must be matched by a lower direct tax rate Td • For simplicity I will represent this requirement as Ti + Td = T
The system given in (9 ) has three non-predetermined, forward-looking or'jump'state variables. The domestic and foreign value added deflators, v and v are flexible, market-clearing prices, as is the nominal exchange rate e . The boundary conditions for-9.
rn-v , 9 m -v and c e + v -v take therefore the form not of given initial conditions but of the terminal or transversality condition that the solution to (10) should lie on the stable manifold (if this exists). For this terminal condition to generate a unique, convergent solution trajectory for 9. , and c , given the actual and anticipated future values of the ten forcing variables, the characteristic equation of (10) 41f a + a* = 1 , the exchange rate is constant, e 0 and
(y*+c*?*)cp (y+CA)e*X*p* -(y*+e*X*)f + (y+cX)*f* + (*+E*A*)5 Absent real balance effects, changes in money growth rates leave the long-run real exchange rate unaffected. With a real balance effect at home, higher money growth at home means a long-run depreciation of the real exchange.rate. The mechanism is that, if A > 0 , higher money growth and domestic inflation lowers the real stock of money balances and thus the demand for output. An improvement in competitiveness is required to rebalance the output market. Fiscal expansion at home causes long-run real appreciation while fiscal expansion abroad has the opposite effect.
It should be clear that a proportional shift in the levels of the domestic or foreign money stock paths will not affect the nominal or real interest rate or the real exchange rate but will be associated with equal proportional shifts in the levels of the paths of p , p and e.
Linear dynamic rational expectations models in continuous time can in general be represented as in equation (12) (t)
where x is an n1 vector of predetermined state variables, y is an n-n1 vector of non-predetermined state variables, and z(t) is a vector of exogenous or forcing variables. We assume that A is diagonal-
• izable and has n1 stable and n -n1 unstable characteristic roots. The boundary conditions for (12) are given by:
The solution should lie on the stable manifold ( n-n1 terminal conditions).
Let A be a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are the charac-A1 0 conformably with x and y as follows:
We also define D
V21B1 + V22B2
The solution to the two-point boundary value problems (12), (13a) and (13b) is given by:
W1A12V J e DEz(T)dtds .
5See Buiter [l984a] .
14 In the classical model of equation (10) the x-vector of predetermined variables vanishes, YT(t) {(t), *(t), c(t)] ,6 and zT (t) hA, p, T1, -r, f, f*, y, T1, Tfl . Thus:
The crucial aspect of equation (15) is that the state variables depend only on current anticipations of future values of the forcing variables.
Current and past behavior of the exogenous variables and the policy instruments matters only to the extent that it influences expectations of the future.
From the general dynamic specification of the model in equations (l)- (8) and from the steady state conditions in equation (11) There are several ways of avoiding these spillovers from domestic monetary growth reductions on real variables that concern foreigners. It is generally accepted that the level of money wages and the GDP deflator are not like the foreign exchange rate or the stock market index.
A common alternative view is that the value added deflator (or the wage) changes only gradually over time in response to excess .demand or supply pressure, e.g., through an augmented Phillips curve:
= j*(y* _j*) + * , iP* > 0 ; 0 < 0* < 1.
In C16) it is recognized that the direct tax rate may influence the behavior of before-tax wages and other factor payments. The two extreme possibilities are that it is the rate of change of after-tax factor rentals (v - Et = (w--Ip(y-)) ; E*= *(w*_*_1P*(y*_7*))
The first model (17) has core inflation equal to the current money growth rate (Dornbusch [1980] , Buiter and Miller [1981] . The second (18) has core inflation given by ' or , the right-side derivative of the price level path of the classical, flex-price model of the previous section.
This means that core inflation equals the rate of change of the price level in the classical equilibrium model except at those points where that rate of change becomes infinite because the classical equilibrium price level makes a discrete juirip. Price equations such as (16) and (18) have been used by Mussa [1981] and Barro and Grossman [1976] .
Equations ( In all three of these models one country's inflation can be eliminated costlessly and at a stroke, given credibility of announce-23 ments of future money growth and given a policy for mimicking or avoiding the need for, the price level drop shown in Figure 1 .
We can write the domestic monetary equilibrium condition as (22) in -
Note that E V -Ord is predetermined.
To achieve an instantaneous transition to a new low-inflation steady state, if theforeign country does not change any of its policy instruments, the home country's policy instruments should satisfy: A combined common reduction in money growth rates at home and abroad will cause a global slump unless both countries undertake simultaneously noney jump policies, indirect tax cuts or fiscal stimuli. If there are no real balance effects, money jumps or indirect tax cuts in the two countries permit an immediate, costless global disinflation at a constant real interest rate and real exchange rate. Even if there are real balance effects, an immediate costless global disinflation will be possible, with money jumps or indirect tax cuts in both countries, at a constant real exchange rate but a higher real interest rate, if the two countries have 6"Indirect tax cut policy" refers to a constant revenue change from indirect to direct taxes. There are therefore no direct aggregate demand effects of such a policy.
identical structures. VJithout this restriction, however, the two fiscal instruments f and f* will have to be used jointly with the reductions in money growth and the money jumps or indirect tax cuts to achieve efficient global disinflation.
How important are the costs of badly-designed disinflation policy?
Consider as a simple illustrative example the wage-price block of equations (4a), (16) and (17) where core inflation equals the rate of growth of the money stock. A little manipulation yields
The cumulative net undiscounted output cost given in (24) increases with the amount by which real money balances must be increased in the long run.
Without a nominal money stock jump, the long-run change in rn-p equals -Ar where means long-run or steady state change. In the simplest case, without real balance effects, r = . The sacrifice ratio is therefore
A unilateral reduction in i has a sacrifice ratio of X/ip , increasing in the interest sensitivity of money demand and decreasing in the slope of the Phillips curve. As is clear from (24) or (25) money jumps or tax cuts could reduce the sacrifice ratio to zero. Note, however, that a real appreciation of the currency (c < 0) also lowers the sacrifice ratio.
The problem is that while -c enters the domestic cost calculation 27 -1 Lc enters the foreign cost calculation. The anti-inflationary gains of real exchange rate appreciation are strictly beggar-thy-neighbor. In addition, the short-run gains from exchange rate appreciation accruing to a single country may well overstate the long-run gains. Note that without real balance effects c = 0 after a unilateral reduction in p. As is shown, e.g., in Buiter and Miller [1983aJ, any initial anti-inflationary gains due to exchange rate appreciation must be "handed back" as the loss of competitiveness unwinds in the long run, since in their model c = 0. Of course the timing of the anti-inflationary successes will be different when the exchange rate is permitted to appreciate sharply in the short run, and early reductions in inflation may be worthwhile in themselves, even if the net output cost of fighting inflation is not affected. It should also be pointed out that the model (like all models in this paper) is assumed to be structurally invariant with respect to the class of policy changes under consideration.
It may be that the "short sharp shock" of a sudden exchange rate appreciation permits one to "over-write" the existing inflation equations. The sluggishness or inertia of the price-wage mechanism could vanish when the government invests in credibility by engineering a brutal appreciation of the exchange rate. I do not consider that possibility in this paper. In any case, the foreign government would be disinvesting in credibility by suffering a brutal depreciation of the exchange rate.
The moral of this section is that if there is only price level inertia but no inflation inertia, well-designed aggregate demand management policy (changes in p, m, f, p*, m* and f*) are sufficient to ensure efficient, i.e., costless and instantaneous unilateral or joint reductions in inflation.8 When a greater degree of inertia is attributed to the wageprice process, this fairly optimistic conclusion vanishes.
80f course, indirect tax cuts may be helpful, if 0 < 0 < 1, even if f is kept constant. It is characterized by a sluggish price level and, subject to some quali-.fications, a sluggish rate of core inflation. For the home country equations (4a) and (16) [1978] we can, as was discussed in the previous section, use direct or indirect tax cuts to break core inflation. Unless 6 = 1 and direct tax increases fully offset the price level effect of equal revenue indirect tax cuts, an indirect tax cut financed by a direct tax increase can melt core inflation. Even if 0 = 1 a net cut in overall taxes can have the desired effect on core inflation. This exercise is then of course complicated by the fact that tax cuts implemented for their cost-reducing effects will also have aggregate demand effects (i.e., £ would increase). Public spending will thei have.to be lowered in such a way as to maintain aggregate demand at full employment. Note the opposite effect of changes in c on the domestic and foreign sacrifice ratios. If the home country through its policy actions were to achieve a long-run appreciation of its real exchange rate (a decline in c ) then the foreign country would, if its inflation objectives are constant, be forced to suffer a cumulative net loss of output. But for this output loss the depreciation of the foreign country's real exchange rate would result in a rise in foreign core inflation.
Note that if some form of incomes policy could shock core inflation, i.e,, jump i , the output cost of bringing down inflation could be reduced or even eliminated altogether without recourse to changes in the tax structure (while keeping the aggregate demand effect of fiscal policy constant) or to beggar-thy--neighbor, zero-sum attempts at "competitive loss of competitiveness."
The rewards from a successful incomes policy would be enormous. The mechanism for achieving it, theoretically and in the light of historical experience, is problematic. With centralized wage bargaining and strong unions capable of delivering on the shop floor wage agreements negotiated centrally, it might be possible to achieve an anti-inflationary breakthrough this way. With decentralized, non-synchronized and non-cooperative wage bargaining someone has to go first while everyone wishes to go last. Proposals for "real wage insurance" through the public purse, floated briefly in the U.S.A. under Carter, may be helpful here. Tax-based income policies are, if anything, primarily a means for lowering the natural rate of unemployment (for raising y). They may, however, when they are introduced, also serve to break the momentum of on-going core inflation.
Proposition 3: If there is both a predetermined price level and quasipredetermined, adaptive, core inflation, the policies required if both countries are to achieve an instantaneous and costless disinflation are the following. Both countries have to announce and implement credible reductions in the rate of growth of their nominal money stocks. Tax cuts (or indirect to direct tax changes) have to be implemented to break core inflation. The lower velocities associated with a successful transition to lower inflation rates will have to be accommodated by a once-and-for-all increase in the level of each country's nominal money stock. Public spending in each country is to be adjusted so as to maintain aggregate demand at its full employment level. Credible nominal income targeting could be a substitute for the money growth deceleration and money level increase. Incomes policy, if effective, could be a substitute for tax cuts.
It might be argued that the view of core inflation embodied in equations (25) and (25') is both too "backward-looking" and too optimistic.
Modern eclectic views of the wage-price process not only incorporate sluggishness in the level and rate of change of wages but also forwardlooking behavior. They also view ir as strictly predetermined, i.e. unlike (25) and (25') changes in the price level brought about through changes in the exchange rate or tax rates, cannot move the level of ir discontinuously. This view is represented in equations (26), (27) and (26'), (27') :
Et* (q**) , > 0 q is the current rate of wage contract inflation.
, core inflation, has the interpretation of "the going rate." It is a function of past contract inflation. Current contract inflation is a function of current expectations of the future state of excess demand and of what the "going rate" will be in the future.
Solving for q and ¶ we find:
Es [(y(z) (27) and (28) simplify to: (27') q(t) = r(t) + 2iEt(y(s))ds
In this model the current contract rate of inflation, q , is nonpredetermined but core inflation or "the going rate" is strictly predetermined.
Barring changes in tax rates and in the real exchange rate, current contract inflation exceeds the going rate if the "present value" of currently expected future excess demand is positive. Current core inflation equals core inflation at some initial date plus an increasing function of the sum between that initial date and the current date of the present value of future excess demand expected at each instant between these two dates. Domestic current contract inflation can be reduced instantaneously by long-run tax cuts or long-run real exchange rate appreciation. Barring these two channels, only credible announcements of (policies causing) future recessions can bring down current contract inflation. Credibility remains central, but is no longer sufficient to avoid costs. Core inflation cannot be brought down instantaneously even when indirect or direct tax cuts or exchange rate appreciation are announced credibly. It is a function of the entire history of past expectations of future excess demands, tax cuts and real exchange rate appreciation. Barring the last two influences, it is (past expectations of) credible future recessions that bring down core inflation.
Anticipated current and future reductions in nominal income growth or monetary growth can no longer be translated painlessly into lower inflation.
They work if and to the extent that they create expectations of future recessions. Note that this can create some awkward credibility and timeconsistency problems. Assume the authorities announce policies that will cause a deep recession at some future date. It is possible that inflation 33 and core inflation are brought down to their desired level before the recession has actually started. What government,, having licked inflation with the help of the announcement effects of future recessions, would then create a recession merely to validate these past expectations? These expectations would be bygones and a government reoptimizing after inflation had been brought down would be tempted to cheat on its earlier policy commitments. Such a policy announcement would therefore not be credible.
Both global and single-country attempts to reduce inflation will, in the most realistic of our models, always take time. A single country may achieve its anti-inflationary objectives without unemployment and output costs by using cost-reducing tax cuts and real exchange rate appreciation.
The world as a whole can rely only on 'tax cuts and, where feasible, incomes policy. The transition to the low inflation equilibrium will involve the internal and external coordination of time-varying trajectories for monetary growth (including money stock jumps), tax rates and public spending.
If a serious research effort gets underway now, we may be ready with sensible policy packages when there is once again the perceived need to accord high priority to reducing inflation, after the next inflationary outburst.
V. Conclusion
This paper has considered anti-inflationary policy design in an open interdependent economic system. Policy instrument values or rules were treated as though imposed "exogenously." Both for positive analysis (how is policy actually determined?) and for normative analysis (how should policy be designed to achieve a given set of objectives?) it is essential that policy behavior be endogenized through the explicit derivation of decision rules that reflect the objectives and the actual and perceived constraints (economic, technical, administrative, political, and informational) of the policy makers.
Finally, it is important not to be misled by the deterministic nature of the models considered in this paper, into believing that credibility and precommitment require inflexible policy design. Credibility requires that preannounced rules are followed faithfully. These rules can be contingent or conditional in nature. Provided the nature of the rules is understood by private agents--and this means simplicity and transparence but not rigidity--and provided the government's record in sticking to its commitments can be monitored promptly and at little cost, optimal or even merely sensible policy design can incorporate scope for flexible response to new information about the external environment and about actions of other players.
The widely known result, that in models with rationally anticipating, forward-looking private agents, optimal policy design will not in general he time-consistent, has led to resignation to the pursuit of timeconsistent but suboptimal policies or even of time-inconsistent and suboptimal policies. The moral is surely quite different. Timeinconsistency of optimal plans could be viewed as a call for institutional innovation and reform aimed at making the optimal policy time-consistent.
New rewards, sanctions, threats or promises may be designed to render optimal policy incentive-compatible given the new, purpose-built constraints. Institutional, and indeed constitutional innovation can then be compared with resignation to the th best.
